The Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringement by Trimble, Marketa
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
2009
The Public Policy Exception to Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright
Infringement
Marketa Trimble
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law, Marketa.Trimble@unlv.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the
William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Trimble, Marketa, "The Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringement"
(2009). Scholarly Works. Paper 564.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/564
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398037 
642 Trimble Landova lie Vol. 40 
bound by private interests and lobby groups, have one - very small but 
perhaps not to be underestimated - power left in today's debate on copyright 
limitations: to provide independent and balanced interpretations of existing 
legal instruments.6o It would therefore be a pity not to use it. 
Marketa Trimble Landova::-
Public Policy Exception to Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringe-
ment~1- ~I-
In recent years proposals have been made for an international convention 
that would facilitate a smooth recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments in intellectual property matters.! Like all of these proposals, the 
American Law Institute's preliminary version, short titled "Draft Principles"2 
published in March 2007,3 strives to eliminate most hurdles to recognition 
60 See in the context of European copyright law C. GEIGER, "Drafting the appropriate and 
balanced scope of copyright protection in the European Union - What language can 
contribute to the debate", in: A. DRASSINOWER & Y. GENDREAU (eds.), "Language and 
Copyright", (Yvon Blais, QuebeclBruylant, Brussels, forthcoming) . 
.. J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School. 
.... This work was funded by the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The contents of this 
publication are solely the responsibility of the grantee. The author would like to thank 
Professor Paul Goldstein of Stanford Law School and Assistant Professor Hillel Levin of 
the University of Georgia School of Law for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts 
of this article. The author is also indebted to Professor Mark Lemley of Stanford Law 
School and the staff of the Robert Crown Law Library for their kind support. 
1 ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS & JANE C. GINSBURG, "Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters," 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1065 
(2001-2002); JOSEF DREXL & ANETIE KUR (eds.), "Intellectual Property and Private Inter-
national Law - Heading for the Future" (Hart Publishing 2005) - a publication by the 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law; Exclusive Juris-
diction and Cross Border IP (Patent) Infringement Suggestions for Amendment of the 
Brussels Regulation, European Max Planck Group for Conflict of Laws in Intellectual 
Property, 20 December 2006, http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/clip_brussels_i_dec_ 
06_final.pdf, last visited on 27 March 2008. The topic was discussed at a numher of 
conferences; lately, for instance, at the conference "Intellectual Property and Private Inter-
national Law" organized by the Bayreuth University in April 2008. 
2 "Intellectual Property - Principles .Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments 
in Transnational Disputes," Proposed Final Draft, The American Law Institute, 30 March 
2007. 
3 Professors Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Jane C. Ginsburg and Franc;oise Dessemontet servco as 
the reporters for the project. 
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and enforcement by providing rules for jurisdiction, choice of law and 
coordination of multi-territorial actions. As long as the rules are applied by 
the court that issues a judgment (the "rendering court"), most of the obsta-
cles to recognition and enforcement - differing jurisdictional rules and 
choice of law rules of various countries - are eliminated. Therefore, absent 
some fundamental problems in the legal system of the rendering court, such 
as its lack of impartiality or integrity,4 the only remaining possible defense to 
recognition and enforcement of the judgment is the public policy exception.5 
Introduction 
The "public policy exception" permits a court that is asked to recognize and 
enforce a foreign judgment (the "enforcing court") to reject doing so if that 
court determines that recognition and enforcement would contradict a fun-
damental public policy of the enforcing country. It is unclear how often 
parties raise the exception since, unfortunately, as with many other features 
of private international law, the utilization of the exception has not been 
adequately captured by empirical data. 6 Dean Symeonides suggests that the 
exception is raised quite frequently. 7 However, parties apparently rarely 
succeed in their attempts to prevent recognition and enforcement by invok-
ing the exception because courts tend to apply it sparsely. 8 Available cases 
indicate that the exception is not a more common feature in the copyright 
area than in other areas of law, but judgments in copyright infringement 
4 Sec. 403(l)(a)-(d) of the ALI Principles. Intellectual Property: Principles Governing Jurisdic-
tion, Choice of Law, and Judgments in Transnational Disputes, Proposed Final Draft, The 
American Law Institute, 30 March 2007, 272-273. 
5 Id., Sec. 403(1)(e), at 273. 
6 On the general need for empirical work in private international law and conflict of laws, 
see HILLEL Y. LEVIN, "What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law 
Revolution?," 60 Stan. L. Rev. 247. 
7 SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, "Recognition of Foreign-Country Judgments," in: SYMEON 
C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (eds), "Conflict of 
Laws - American, Comparative, International" 846 (West Group, 2003). 
8 There are no statistics available on the frequency of the phenomenon or a study that would 
compare success rate of parties with the exception and other grounds for non-recognition. 
However, judges and scholars agree that the success rate in case of the public policy excep-
tion is low. See, for instance, Lloyd's v. Meinzer, 2001 CanLII 8586 (Court of Appeal for 
Ontario, 2001), point 360; ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, "Recogni-
tion of Foreign Adjudications - A Survey and A Suggested Approach," 81 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1601, 1670; KAREN E. MINEHAN, "The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments - Necessary or Nemesis?," 18 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 795, 809; 
JONATHAN H. PITMAN, "The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign Judg-
ments," 22 Vande J. Transnat'l L. 969, 981; JOOST BLOM, "Public Policy in Private Interna-
tional Law and Its Evolution in Time," 2003 Netherlands International Law Review 373, 
399; ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - Gen-
eral Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements," in: "Recueil des Cours, Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law," 1980, II, 47 (Academie de Droit 
International, Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alpena an den Rijn, The Netherlands, 1981). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2398037 
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cases are not completely immune from the exception, as shown in a recent 
case in the United States. 
In Sari Louis Feraud Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc.,9 a French plaintiff brought 
an action to enforce a French judgment in the U.S. against a U.S. defendant 
who was found liable for copyright infringement under French law when the 
defendant displayed the plaintiff's fashion designs on a website. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit scrutinized the French judgment 
under the lens of freedom of speech of the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution because freedom of speech was identified as the significant 
public policy at issue. The court concluded that as long as the level of free 
speech protection provided by French law as applied in this case was lower 
than the free speech protection under U.s. copyright law's fair use defense, 
the U.S. protection would prevail and the French judgment would be denied 
recognition and enforcement in the U.S. 
Viewfinder illustrates that the public policy exception, although low in 
frequency, can be a hurdle to recognition and enforcement, and, therefore, 
the case invites an analysis of effects on copyright enforcement of maintain-
ing the exception as one of the grounds for non-recognition in an interna-
tional instrument on recognition and enforcement. Ideally, the international 
instrument should treat the exception in the same manner as other obstacles 
and eliminate the problem by unifying the exception. However, as the 
following discussion reveals regarding the general. characteristics of the 
exception as embedded in national laws, unification is not an option in this 
case. The exception must thus remain part of any international instrument 
on recognition and enforcement - a fact recognized by all existing proposals. 
Is the public policy exception a problem for cross-border copyright enforce-
ment? The present article suggests that it is. With all other obstacles elimi-
nated, the public policy exception will remain the last hurdle, and it has the 
potential to complicate cross-border enforcement of judgments in copyright 
infringement cases. Without the possibility of unification, other methods 
need to be found that would minimize the use of the exception so as to 
enhance cross-border copyright enforcement without compromising each 
country's fundamental public policies. 
1. The Public Policy Exception 
There are two main characteristics of the public policy exception in private 
international law: first, its lack of clarity in scope and content and, second, 
its indispensability. No one knows exactly what public policy encompasses 
but everyone wants to maintain the possibility of claiming the exception. 
Even if general definitions of the exception are similar in various countries, 
their precise content remains unclear unless a case emerges that requires a 
court to (1) identify a particular public policy and (2) recognize it as being 
9 Louis Feraud Sari, Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3 d 474, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1105 (2nd 
Circuit Court, 2007). 
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fundamental enough to trigger the application of the exception. The author-
ity to make such determinations is considered one of the crucial expressions 
of the sovereignty of a country; even with the utmost respect for laws issued 
and judgments rend~red in other countries, a domestic court will not apply 
foreign laws or enforce foreign judgments if there is a fundamental public 
policy of the enforcing country that is contrary to such laws or judgments. 
The exception is destined to keep its firm place in any proposal for an 
international instrument designed to be adopted by sovereign countries. No 
matter how highly harmonized the legal matter at issue or how close the 
public policies of the country-signatories, as long as a participating country 
wishes to preserve its sovereignty, it will not abdicate the exception. 
The first part of the following section briefly reviews the exception as it is 
defined and applied by various countries. It further shows that the flexibility 
of the exception, combined with its prominent position in the concept of a 
country's sovereignty, prevents an effective harmonization of the exception 
through an international instrument. The second subsection traces the excep-
tion in existing or proposed international instruments that are (or would be, 
if adopted) applicable to copyright infringement cases. Other instruments of 
private international law that would not affect copyright infringement cases 
are not addressed. 
1. The Public Policy Exception in National Laws 
The public policy exception tends to be legislated in private international 
laws, and even when it is not expressly stipulated by country legislation, 
there exists a consensus among countries that the exception pertains and 
may be applied. Even when legislated, its definition varies from country to 
country and case law constantly shapes its content; such flexibility is under-
standably necessary because the content needs to mirror the political and 
social developments of a country.10 It is this flexibility that makes the public 
policy exception unfit for any harmonization project. tt 
An attempt at eliminating the exception failed in the European Union, even 
though its Member States are relatively close socially and legally. The 1968 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters,12 to which ED countries had subscribed, 
included the exception. So does the Brussels Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the "Brussels I 
10 For discussion of sources of international public policy, see BLOM, supra note 8, at 384 et 
seq. 
11 "From its inception, public policy appears to have constantly defied all attempts at precise 
definition." KOlO YELPAALA, "USA - Chapter I, General Principles," in MAURO RUBINO-
SAMMARTANO & e.G.J. MORSE (eds.), "Public Policy in Transnational Relationships," 
Part USA, 9 (Kluwer Law International, 1997). 
12 "Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters," 27 September 1968, Official Journal C 27, 26 January 1998 (consolidated text). 
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Regulation"),13 which governs the enforcement issues among EU Member 
States today. The adoption of the Brussels I Regulation was a great step 
forward in the process of European integration as enforcement issues pro-
gressed from an international treaty to an instrument that is directly applic-
able in all EU Member States. However, the exception was not eliminated; it 
remained in the text, albeit newly accompanied by the qualification that the 
judgment must be "manifestly contrary to public policy."14 
Within the EU, public policy for the purposes of the exception is defined by 
each Member State; however, when the exception is applied under the 
Brussels i Regulation, the Court of Justice of the EU (the "ECJ") may "re-
view the limits within which the courts of a [Member State] may have 
recourse to that concept"15 because "while the [Member States] in principle 
remain free ... to determine, according to their own conceptions, what 
public policy requires, the limits of that concept are a matter for interpreta-
tion of the [Brussels I Regulation]."16 In Krombach v. Bamberski the ECJ 
specified that for the exception to be applied among the EU Member States, 
the judgment would have to 
be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of [the enforcing 
country] inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle and the infringe-
ment would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of [the enforcing country] or of a right recognized 
as being fundamental within that order. 17 
In the u.S. the public policy exception is not applied when sister-state 
judgments are recognized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the u.S. 
Constitution; however, the exception is a valid ground for non-recognition 
of foreign (non-U.S.) judgments. It was included in the 1962 Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act1S and its revised version - the 2005 
Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act 19 - with one 
difference concerning application that is discussed later. The exception was 
also reiterated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 
(1987).20 The conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments remain a matter of state, not federal law, but even under a proposed 
federal statute, the 2005 American Law Institute (ALI) Draft Proposed 
Federal Statute on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,21 the 
13 "Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters," Official 
Journal L 12, 16 January 2001. 
14 Article 34(1) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13. 
15 Dieter Krombach v. Andre Bamberski, ECJ, C-7198, 28 March 2000, point 23. 
16 Ibid., point 22. 
17 Ibid., point 37. 
l8 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 1962, Sec. 4(b)(3). 
19 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 2005, Sec. 4(c)(3). 
20 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 1987, Sec. 482(2)(d). 
21 "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - Analysis and Proposed Federal 
Statute," ALI, Sec. 5(a)(iv). 
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exception would be maintained. Various U.S. courts have formulated stan-
dards for the public policy exception in the context of recognition and 
enforcement,. but no uniform definition results from the case law.22 The 
Viewfinder decision, for instance, relies on the Second Circuit Court's defini-
tion in Tahan v. Hodgson, which adopts the wording from a comment to 
Sec. 117 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. This source denies 
the recognition of a foreign judgment if it is "repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is 
sought. "23 
The definitions of public policy attached to the public policy exception 
remain purposefully vague and, therefore, it is impossible to assess their 
expansiveness or narrowness in the abstract. Solely in the context of a 
particular application may one determine whether courts approached the 
exception in a comity-furthering manner. For instance, Yeow-Choy Choong 
criticizes as overbroad and comity-hindering the definition adopted and 
applied by the High Court of Malaysia in a 2007 decision in The Ritz Hotel 
Casino Ltd v. Datuk Seri Osu Haji Sukam (2005).24 The case involved a 
plaintiff who sought recognition and enforcement of a judgment by the 
English High Court concerning payment of a gambling debt. The High Court 
refused to recognize and enforce the English judgment based on the public 
policy exception, asserting rather that "anything that is injurious to public 
welfare" and "anything that seeks to go against the Rukun Negara" (the 
country's·national philosophy) is against public policy.25 
The extent of the application of the exception is determined not only by the 
definition of public policy but also by the object of the exception. Ideally, the 
public policy scrutiny should be focused only on the effects that the judgment 
is likely to engender in the enforcing country.26 From the comity perspective, 
22 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir-
cuit Court, 2006), 1214-1215. 
23 Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (2nd Circuit Court), 864; Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws Sec. 117 (1971). 
24 YEOW-CHOY CHOONG, "Enforcement of Foreign judgments - The Role of Courts in Pro-
moting (or Impeding) Global Business," 1;2 International Journal of Human and Social 
Sciences, 92-95 (Spring 2007). 
25 Ibid., 93. 
26 "The fact that the German judge, if he had to make a decision on the trial, would, by the 
application of binding German law, have come to a different conclusion to that reached 
by the foreign law, does not mean that a foreign judgment is incompatible with substan-
tive ordre public . ... What is much more important is the question of whether the result 
of the application of foreign law conflicts so strongly with the fundamental concepts of 
the German regulations and with the notions of justice contained within them as to make 
it seem intolerable on the basis of domestic notions," quoted from judgment of German 
Federal Supreme Court, IX ZR 149/91, 4 june 1992, translated by GERHARD WEGEN & 
JAMES SHERER, 32 I.L.M. 1320, 1333. "The defence only operates if the recognition rather 
than the judgment itself is contrary to public policy," quoted from JAMES j. FAWCETf & 
PAUL TORREMANS, "Intellectual Property and Private International Law" 728 (Clarendon 
(Contd. on page 648) 
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it seems appropriate that the court of the forum refrain from evaluating the 
foreign law on which the foreign judgment is based. In the EU, the Brussels I 
Regulation prohibits any review of a foreign judgment as to its substance,27 
and the ECJ in Krombach explained the prohibition to mean that the sole 
discrepancy between underlying laws cannot be the grounds for non-recogni-
tion of the foreign judgment. Similarly, courts in the U.S. have recognized 
that differences in underlying laws do not usually suffice to trigger the 
exception; after all, as aptly formulated by Chief Judge Henley of U.S. 
District Court for Eastern District of Arkansas in Toronto-Dominion Bank 
v. Hall, the "very idea of a law of conflicts of laws presupposes differences in 
the laws of various jurisdictions and that different initial results may be 
obtained depending upon whether one body of law is applied or another."28 
Similarly, the Second Circuit Court in Yahoo! noted that, "inconsistency 
with American law is not necessarily enough to prevent recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States. The foreign judg-
ment must be, in addition, repugnant to public policy."29 
However, in practice it is difficult for a court of an enforcing country to 
overlook the underlying law of the rendering country. First, although a 
difference in relevant laws of the rendering and enforcing countries does not 
automatically make a judgment based on such laws unenforceable, it might 
indicate that underlying public policies vary. If that is the case, it is upon the 
court of the enforcing country to find whether it is a public policy of the 
fundamental nature that justifies application of the exception. Second, re-
cognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment effectively endorses the 
foreign law that underlies the foreign judgment; such endorsement requires 
that the judgment not exceed the public policy limits acceptable to the 
enforcing country's society.30 Therefore, courts cannot truly separate the 
scrutiny of the potential effects of recognition from the content of the under-
lying foreign law. 31 Von Mehren and Trautman observed that when the 
(Contd. from page 647) 
Press, 1998). E.g., England, Australia, Germany, Poland. Rule 44, "Dicey and Morris on 
the Conflict of Laws," 13th ed., Vol. 1 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 525; Foreign Judgments 
Act 1991, Art. 7(2)(a)(x); Zivilprozessordnung, Sec. 328 (1); Kodeks post~powania cywil-
nego, Sec. 1146. 
27 Articles 36 and 45(2) of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13. 
28 Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F.Supp. (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Arkansas), 1016 (1973). 
29 Yahoo!, Inc., v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, supra note 22, at 1215. 
30 By recognizing the foreign judgment, the court gives the judgment res iudicata effect, 
which prevents the parties from re-litigating the matter before the enforcing court and 
perhaps obtaining a different result. If the enforcing court had jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter and could adjudicate the original case, it would not apply the law 
of the other country if the court considered the law to be repugnant to public policy. 
31 "Each public policy test involves a comparison of foreign law being the basis of the judg-
ment to be enforced and the principles of the lex fori." ERNST C. STIEFEL, ROLF STURNER 
& ASTRID STADLER, "The Enforceability of Excessive U.S. Punitive Damage Awards in 
Germany," 1991 The American Journal of Comparative Law, 39, 779, 797-798. 
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public policy exception is used, it is almost always in connection with 
concerns of the enforcing state over the rendering country's law that was 
applied in the case.32 
In the u.s. the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 
Sec. 4(b)(3) created the opposite problem when it suggested that the foreign 
law itself should be the object of public policy scrutiny. The 1962 Uniform 
Act stated that a "foreign judgment need not be recognized if ... the [cause 
of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to 
the public policy of the state."33 The language caused some courts to adopt a 
narrow approach such as the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws recognized when it revisited the 1962 Uniform Act: 
"Based on this 'cause of action' language, some courts interpreting the 1962 
Act have refused to find that a public policy challenge based on something 
other than repugnancy of the foreign cause of action comes within this 
exception. "34 In response to these decisions, the drafters of the 2005 Uni-
form Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act not only refer to 
the "[cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based" but 
also add "the judgment" itself as an object of the public policy scrutiny. 35 
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987)36 and the 2005 
ALI Draft Proposed Federal Statute on recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments37 use similar wording. 
32 TRAUTMAN VON MEHREN, supra note 8, at 1670. 
33 Similarly, in Nigeria the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1958 stated 
that a judgment would not be registered if "the judgment was in respect of a cause of 
action which, on grounds of public policy, could have not been entertained by the register-
ing court," in: DENNIS CAMPBELL (ed.), "Enforcement of Foreign Judgments" 316 (LLP 
Limited, 1997). In Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act (Chap-
ter 264), Art. 3(2)(f): "No judgment shall be ordered to be registered ... if ... the judg-
ment was in respect of a cause of action which for reasons of public policy or for some 
other similar reason could not have been entertained by the registering court." The 1958 
Nigerian Act was replaced (although only partially, as interpreted by the 2003 decision of 
the Nigerian Supreme Court in Macaulay v. R.Z.B. of Austria) by the 1990 Act, which 
provides that "the registration of the judgment ... shall be set aside if the registering court 
is satisfied ... that the enforcement of the judgment would be contrary to public policy in 
Nigeria." Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1990, Art. 6(1)(a)(v). See also 
English Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, Art. 4(1)(a)(v). 
34 Comments on Sec. 4 of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 
2005, 11-12, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bIVarchives/ulc/ufmjra/2005fina1. pdf, last visited 
on 17 March 2008. 
35 Section 4(c)(3) of the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. 
As of 17 March 2008, a majority of states in the U.S. still follows the 1962 version of the 
Uniform Act (30 states, District of Columbia and U.S. Virgin Islands). Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgments Recognition Act, Legislative Factsheet, http://www.nccusl.orgiUpdate/ 
uniformaccfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp, last visited on 17 March 2008. 
36 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law Sec. 482(2)(d) (1987). 
37 "Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments - Analysis and Proposed Federal 
Statute," ALI Principles, supra, Sec. 5(a)(iv). 
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Even though courts have difficulties avoiding scrutiny of the underlying law, 
they remain consistent in their attempts to apply the public policy exception 
narrowly.38 One way to narrow the effects of the exception is to apply an 
interest analysis and utilize a specific standard depending on the degree of 
interest of the enforcing country. For instance, in Germany and Switzerland 
distinctions have been made depending on the connection that a foreign 
judgment has to the enforcing country; courts in these countries have decided 
that "a more serious violation of public policy" is required "to refuse recog-
nition when the litigation has little connection to the recognition state than if 
that connection is strong."39 In the U.S. the original comity case, Hilton 
v. Guyot, also limited the application of the public policy exception to a 
country's "own citizens, or ... other persons who are under the protection of 
its laws."4o 
Finally, since this review provides an introduction to the exception in the 
area of copyright, an area affected by a number of international treaties, it is 
instructive to note the role such treaties have in recognition and enforcement 
of judgments that rely on national laws that should comply with the treaties. 
As is the case with national laws, divergence from the provisions of interna-
tional treaties to which the enforcing country is a party does not automati-
cally warrant the application of the public policy exception; it should not be 
applied so widely as to effectively sanction the rendering country for not 
adhering to certain international treaties. 
As for the elimination of the public policy exception itself, international 
treaties have had no success so far, and, as the following survey indicates, no 
proposals have ventured to define or delimit the public policy exception. 
2. The Public Policy Exception in International Instruments on Recognition 
and Enforcement 
There was probably never a more appropriate moment to eliminate the 
public policy exception from the process of recognition and enforcement 
than during the negotiations of the Brussels I Regulation,41 the successor of 
the Brussels Convention. Designed to bind only EU Member States, the 
Regulation was to operate among countries whose laws had been signifi-
38 See, for instance, Krombach v. Bamberski, supra note 15, point 21; Ackermann v. Levine, 
788 F.2d 830 (2nd Circuit Court, 1986); Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 
416 (Supreme Court of Canada), point 75. 
39 GERHARD WALTER & SAMUEL P. BAUMGARTNER (eds.), "Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Outside the Scope of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions" 28-29 
(Kluwer Law International, 2000). "Prevailing German literature states that German pub-
lic policy can only be invoked if the litigation which led to the foreign decision contains 
any links with Germany. The fact that enforcement is requested in Germany is not suffici-
ent": KURT G. WElL, FABIENNE KUTSCHER-PUIS & CAROLINE HERON, "Germany," in: 
RUBINO-SAMMARTANO & MORSE, supra note 11, at 67. 
40 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (US Supreme Court, 1895) 164. 
41 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001, supra note 13. 
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cantly unified or harmonized and whose cultural and social conditions had 
been close enough to support an expectation that their public policies would 
largely be the same. However, the only achievement was the insertion of the 
word "manifestly" to the standard; it is now required by Art. 34.1 that a 
judgment not be recognized if it is "manifestly contrary to public policy" in 
the enforcing country. Judgments in intellectual property matters fall within 
the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. Within the larger European Economic 
Area,42 the Lugano Convendon, which paralleled the Brussels Convention in 
1988 and was revised in 2007, applies the same "manifest" requirement for 
the public policy exception to the countries of the Area.43 
There have been attempts to introduce similar large-scope multilateral con-
ventions that would be embraced by more countries than those adopting the 
Brussels and Lugano Conventions. The Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law produced the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters in 1971, but it was 
ratified by only four countries. The matter was reopened more than twenty 
years later, based on a 1992 proposal by the U.S., and a new draft convention 
on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments was discussed.44 
However, jurisdictional matters proved to be the most controversial part of 
the draft. Notwithstanding the controversies, the Conference achieved im-
portant progress in specific areas (including patents and trademarks),45 and 
reached an agreement in 2002 to postpone work on the draft and prepare a 
new proposal that would avoid conflicts among countries on jurisdictional 
rules. To minimize the controversy, an informal working group of the Con-
ference eventually proposed a draft limited solely to the exclusive choice of 
court agreements; thus the result of the multi-year endeavor became the 
2005 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The Convention is limited 
to business-to-business agreements but would also apply to choice-of-court 
agreements between businesses in copyright infringement cases.46 
The failure to generate a convention that would be universal in scope and 
acceptable to a large number of countries influenced experts working on the 
42 Today the Area comprises Member States of the European Communities in addition to 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; however, Liechtenstein is not a party to 
the Lugano Convention. 
43 Article 34(1), "Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters," available at http://www.ofj.admin.chletcl 
medialib/data/wirtschaftlipr.Par.0022.File.tmp/260307 _entw_lugano_convention-e.pdf, last 
visited on 27 October 2008. 
44 For an overview of the development of the proposal, see, e.g., ANDREA SCHULZ, "The 
Hague Conference Project for a Global Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and En-
forcement in Civil and Commercial Matters (the Hague Judgments Project), Electronic 
Commerce and Intellectual Property," in: ANDREA SCHULZ (ed.), "Legal Aspects of an 
E-Commerce Transaction" 293-308 (Sellier, 2006). 
45 MARC E. HANKIN, "Comment - Now That We Know 'The Way Forward,' Let Us Stay the 
Course," 77 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1295, 1300-1301. 
46 Article 2(2)(0) of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 2005. 
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intersection of intellectual property and private international law who began 
considering an intellectual property-specific solution. In 2001 Professors 
Dreyfuss and Ginsburg presented a Draft Convention on the Jurisdiction and 
Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters,47 which started a 
debate on the potential success of such an area-focused approach.48 The 
Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Draft Convention included the public policy exception as 
grounds for discretionary non-recognition in Art. 25 (1 )(g);49 the Commen-
tary on the Draft envisaged a narrow application of the exception, which 
"should be reserved for cases when enforcing the judgment would cause 
extreme-manifest incompatibility problems."5o 
Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg, together with Professor Dessemontet, 
also served as reporters to the ALI project that in 2007 produced "Intellec-
tual Property - Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judg-
ments in Transnational Disputes" in intellectual property cases.51 Although 
the drafters of the Principles concentrated on other aspects of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments,52 they also elaborated on the public 
policy exception, which is one of the grounds for mandatory non-recognition 
under Sec. 403(1)(e) of the Principles. When commenting on the content of 
public policy within the context of the public policy exception, the drafters 
emphasize "strong public interests in access to the material protected,"53 but 
at the same time urge that "enforcement of judgments in favor of intellectual 
property holders should be denied sparingly."54 Regarding the object of 
scrutiny, the drafters suggest that a court "should consider only the outcome 
of litigation, not the substance or procedure by which the outcome was 
achieved. "55 Additionally, the drafters hope that more judgments will be 
enforceable under the Principles (a hope shared by the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg 
Draft) because the Principles enable the enforcing court to adjust the reme-
47 DREYFUSS & GINSBURG, supra note 1. 
48 E.g., ANNETTE KuR, "International Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments - A Way Forward for LP.," 24(4) E.LP.R. 175-183 (2002); JONATHAN A. FRANKLIN 
& ROBERTA J. MORRIS, "Symposium on Constructing International Intellectual Property 
Law - The Role of National Courts - International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in the Era of Global Networks - Irrelevance of, Goals for, and Comments on the 
Current Proposals," 77 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1213; Hankin, supra note 45. 
49 DREYFUSS & GINSBURG, supra note 1, at 1084. 
50 Ibid., 1138. 
51 "Intellectual Property - Principles Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and Judgments 
in Transnational Disputes," ALI Principles, supra note 2. 
52 The provisions concentrated on (1) strengthening the role of the Principles by permitting a 
court to refuse recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment if the Principles were not 
followed in the original proceedings in which the judgment was issued and (2) introducing 
procedures to adjust any remedies awarded in the foreign judgment to local conditions. 
I bid., xxii. 
53 Ibid., 276. 
54 Ibid., 276. 
55 Ibid., 276. 
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dies awarded by the foreign judgment if they are unacceptable to the enforc-
ing country. 
Other experts have explored the possibilities of an international instrument 
that would facilitate the smooth recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments in intellectual property matters. Building on its tradition of ex-
tensive studies of issues of international patent enforcement and private 
internati~nal law,56 the Max Planck Institute created a working Group for 
Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property, which has been preparing a Euro-
pean counterpart to the ALI Principles. Other scholars have contributed to 
the debate as well but have preserved the public policy exception: The 
exception was criticized but retained by Yoav Oestreicher in his proposal for 
a "simple" convention (as opposed to a "double" or "mixed" convention), 
i.e., a convention that would avoid jurisdictional issues altogether and con-
centrate solely on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.57 
Although he expressed some criticism of the public policy exception, Oes-
treicher suggested that it cannot be abolished at present. He submitted that 
the exception should eventually be replaced "with an adequate substitution 
that would fill the current function that the public policy mechanism fills"58 
but, unfortunately, did not elaborate on the character of such substitution. 
Another proposal for an international instrument in this area, this time 
limited specifically to court decisions in copyright cases, was developed by 
Roberto Garza Barbosa, who included the public policy exception as one of 
the grounds for discretionary non-recognition. 59 
All authors seem to understand that any proposal for an international instru-
ment stands no chance of adoption if the public policy exception is missing. 
As long as the instrument is designed to bind sovereign countries, it must 
retain this important tool of sovereignty. Any attempt to harmonize the 
content of public policy among sovereign countries is fruitless; the flexibility 
of the concept and its constant reshaping in time make harmonization 
impossible.60 The impossibility of harmonization applies even to public 
policy limited to a certain area of law, such as intellectual property. Even 
such a highly harmonized area of law is influenced by a number of public 
policies over which countries do not intend to relinquish control. 
The ALI proposal suggests that through unification of jurisdictional rules 
and choice of law rules, most of the common grounds for non-recognition 
may be eliminated. However, as totally non-unified and non-unifiable 
56 See also DREXL & KuR, supra note 1. 
57 YOAV OESTREICHER, "The Rise and the Fall of the "Mixed" and "Double" Convention 
Models Regarding Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments," 6 Wash. U. Global 
Stud. L. Rev. 339. 
58 Ibid., 371. 
59 ROBERTO GARZA BARBOSA, "International Copyright Law and Litigation - A Mechanism 
for Improvement," 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 77, 130. 
60 On the time dimension of public policy, see BLoM, supra note 10, at 383 et seq. 
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grounds for non-recognition, the exception resists all attempts to minimize 
the incidence of non-recognition. Some may argue that the persistence of the 
exception will not present a significant problem because courts apply the 
exception so rarely, as evidenced by the few decisions concerning the issue 
available from the only current "testing ground" in which the exception 
remains the last un-unified ground for non-recognition - countries of the 
Brussels I Regulation and the Lugano Convention. Perhaps it is not a coin-
cidence that the case that initiated the present inquiry, the Viewfinder case, 
concerns recognition outside the Brussels I Regulation or Lugano framework 
and, additionally, involves infringing activities committed on the Internet. As 
such, Viewfinder may become the prototype for public policy exception 
problems as the Internet becomes the primary global dissemination facility. 
II. Copyright Infringement Cases and the Public Policy 
Exception 
The recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment may arise as a 
problem in a copyright infringement case if remedies cannot be enforced in 
the country where the judgment was issued, or if recognition is needed to 
achieve the res iudicata effect in another country. To enforce an injunction, 
the copyright owner must address a court in the country where the infringing 
act originates; to enforce damages, the owner must revert to the country of 
the infringer's assets. The res iudicata effect will be needed to stop re-litiga-
tion of the matter, which means that one of the parties may have to seek 
recognition of the foreign judgment in a country where the other party tries 
to bring the matter to a court and obtain a more favorable adjudication. 61 
Furthermore, the problem of a potential cross-border recognition and 
enforcement of a foreign judgment may be considered hypothetically by a 
court in deciding whether a case should be dismissed on the grounds of 
forum non conveniens, because enforceability of a judgment possibly ren-
dered in a foreign forum should be one of the factors that a court must 
consider before dismissing a case based on forum non conveniens.62 If a 
court knows that the court in the only other available forum would likely 
render a judgment that would be unenforceable in an enforcing country, a 
dismissal and referral to such an alternative forum would produce an un-
enforceable and therefore unjust result. 
Instances in which copyright owners seek recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in copyright infringement cases are likely to become more fre-
quent because of the impact of the Internet. Cross-border infringements 
were certainly not introduced by the Internet, but the Internet has contribut-
61 On justiciability of foreign copyright claims, see for instance, SAM RICKETSON & JANE 
C. GINSBURG, "International Copyright and Neighboring Rights," 1296-1297 (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
62 Murray v. British Broadcasting Company, 906 F.Supp. 858 (U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, 1995), 863. 
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ed significantly to the speed, low cost, and geographical magnitude with 
which such infringements may be committed today. Additionally, the Inter-
net has facilitated a convenient way to strategically locate acts and assets 
away from the location of infringement. It has been predicted that the 
Internet will contribute to an increase in cross-border litigation,63 and, 
consequently, "[i]nternational judgment recognition [will become] a core 
issue of effective cyberspace regulation."64 Cases like Viewfinder in which a 
defendant is physically absent from the country of infringement, his assets 
too are located elsewhere, and his activities originate in a foreign country are 
unlikely to be unique in the future. 
It is therefore important to analyze the role that the public policy exception 
might have in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in copyright 
infringement matters. Even if countries eventually adhere to an international 
instrument that eliminates the most significant obstacles, the public policy 
exception will survive the efforts and stand as potentially the last hurdle to 
recognition and enforcement. The present section analyzes the exception 
from two perspectives: first, the exception is considered as it might be 
applied to the rendering country's underlying copyright laws; and, second, 
the application of the exception to the effects of the foreign judgment is 
assessed. The aim of the analysis is to envisage a world in which no other 
grounds for non-recognition exist, i.e., the kind of world that could be 
achieved if countries adopt an instrument, such as the ALI Principles, that 
eliminates such other grounds. The analysis ignores procedural public policy 
because, although issues of procedural character certainly can trigger the 
public policy exception in copyright infringement cases, such issues are not 
copyright-specific. 
1. The Public Policy Exception and Copyright Subject Matter, Ownership 
and Infringing Acts 
Despite the high degree of copyright harmonization that has been achieved 
at the international level, differences among copyright laws of various coun-
tries exist, and some of them exhibit the very same diverging public policy 
notions that prevent countries from advancing in international harmoniza-
tion and that may also prevent courts from recognizing and enforcing foreign 
judgments in copyright infringement cases.65 These are the notions that 
63 E.g., THOMAS S. LEATHERBURY, "ALI Takes Position on Foreign Judgments (Including 
those against the Media)," 23-SUM Comm. Law. 25. 
64 MATHIAS REIMANN, "Introduction - The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyber-
age," 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 663, 670. 
65 It "is not so much the unification of private law which allows for the harmonization of 
Private International Law but the unification of the underlying public policy issues." 
SIMONE PETER, "Sovereignty, Comity and the Public Policy Exception," A Comment Pre-
sented at the Kandersteg Conference on Constitutionalism, 17-20 January 2008, http:// 
www.nccr-trade.org/images/stories/projects/ipl/Peter_Simone_Comment%200n%20Joerges 
%20and%20Wolf.pdf, last visited on 6 October 2008. 
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justify a scrutiny of copyright laws underlying foreign judgments in copy-
right cases even though, as noted earlier, such a scrutiny of foreign law 
should be avoided. However, the following analysis of the three possible 
approaches submits that the scrutiny is unavoidable. 
Under the first approach, issues of subject matter, ownership and infringing 
acts would be completely excluded from public policy scrutiny because 
confronting them with the public policy of the forum would mean that the 
foreign law itself would be judged. This exclusion represents the most 
comity-furthering approach, which appears to be in line, for instance, with 
the ALI proposa1.66 The approach is based on the premise that although the 
enforcing country may not agree with all aspects of the foreign law applied 
in the given case, it is willing to enforce it - obviously, with the expectation 
that the foreign country will respond similarly if the situation reverses in the 
future. 
The second approach - the opposite extreme - would insist on a full public 
policy scrutiny of the foreign law that was applied in the given case to issues 
of subject matter, ownership and infringing acts. It is important to remember 
that under such scrutiny, only the fundamental public policy of the domestic 
forum should be considered. As a general rule, not every slight difference in 
copyright laws should be deemed a variance in fundamental public policies. 
However, if variances in laws reflect significant differences in fundamental 
public policies, such variances are relevant to the scrutiny. For instance, 
awarding copyright protection to a perfume scent may not reflect a funda-
mental public policy; however, denying initial copyright ownership to 
authors of a certain race might contradict a prohibition of discrimination as 
a fundamental public policy of the domestic forum. Under this approach, the 
public policy exception will be applied whether an interest of the enforcing 
country is at stake or not. 
A compromise between these two approaches might constitute the third 
approach, under which issues of subject matter, ownership and infringing 
acts would be subjected to public policy scrutiny only if and to the extent 
that the enforcing country has an interest in these issues. For instance, a 
court of country A would not apply the scrutiny to any of these issues if it 
were deciding on the recognition and enforcement of monetary relief 
awarded by a judgment of a court in country B against a national of country 
C for infringement in B of a copyright owned by a national of B. However, 
the question is whether this interest approach is tenable if, in the given 
example, the judgment was based on discriminatory provisions on initial 
ownership in B and the applicable fundamental public policy of A was not 
limited to nationals or residents of A. 
To avoid endorsements of foreign public policies that are antithetical to the 
fundamental public policies of the enforcing country, it seems to be safest for 
66 Supra note 55. 
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the enforcing country to apply the full scrutiny and confront the underlying 
foreign law with its own public policies. Although the existing intellectual 
property-related proposals for an international instrument seem to be headed 
towards the first, most comity-furthering approach, countries may under-
standably be reluctant to relinquish their right to scrutinize the underlying 
law. Once the strictest approach is adopted, the primary issue becomes 
which fundamental public policies courts may find to be affected by the 
foreign copyright law, and what degree of compatibility with their policies 
they will expect from the foreign law. 
The two obvious candidates directly influencing copyright laws are freedom 
of speech and the right to property. Even though views of protecting these 
two rights vary from country to country, copyright laws uniformly evidence 
a weighing of both issues. Because each country attaches different weight to 
the policies, the result of the weighing - the achieved equilibrium - logically 
varies as well. The varying equilibria then contribute to variances in copy-
right laws - differences in what subject matter the countries protect under 
copyright,67 how they regulate copyright ownership (including the vesting of 
initial ownership and transfers of ownership), and which acts they classify as 
infringing upon copyright (including which defenses they provide against 
infringement claims). For instance, the equilibrium is more inclined towards 
the freedom of speech in the U.S., where it finds an expression in the liberally 
framed free-use doctrine, compared to the equilibria in civil law countries 
where a restrictive list of exclusions from copyright protection shows a 
comparatively greater weight given to the right to property. 
Naturally, economic rationales playa great role in shaping copyright laws. 
However, it appears that courts do not consider economic considerations to 
be fundamental public policies with the potential to trigger the public policy 
exception. There are two recent cases in the intellectual property area that 
are illustrative here. First, in 2000 the Eel addressed the problem in Regie 
Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA,68 a case that concerned 
recognition and enforcement in Italy of a French judgment against an Italian 
manufacturer who was found liable for infringement of intellectual property 
rights afforded in France to automobile body parts. The Italian court sub-
mitted three questions to the Eel for preliminary ruling. One asked whether 
the French judgment could be considered contrary to Italian public policy 
because Italy did not have a comparable system of automobile body parts 
protection. The Eel rejected the argument of the Italian manufacturer that 
the non-existence of the corresponding protection in Italy was a manifesta-
67 There are differences in the subject matter that countries protect under copyright; subject 
matter might be protected in one country but not in another, and the level of originality 
required for protection may also vary. For instance, France affords copyright protection to 
fashion designs, while the U.S. does not. A Dutch court confirmed copyright protection 
for a perfume scent, while perfume copyright protection has so far been rejected by other 
countries including the UK and France. 
68 Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Mexicar SpA, C-38/98 ECj (11 May 2000). 
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tion of "a principle of public policy in economic matters"69 and consequently 
held that the lack of protection in Italy did not render the French judgment 
unrecognizable and unenforceable in Italy. Similarly, in Sari Louis Feraud 
Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of New York rejected to recognize reasons for not protecting fashion designs 
in the U.S. as a fundamental public policy that justified application of the 
public policy exception in the case of a French judgment based on the French 
copyright law that protects fashion designs. The court opined that "[i]f the 
United States has not seen fit to permit fashion designs to be copyrighted, 
that does not mean that a foreign judgment based on a contrary policy 
decision is somehow repugnant to the public policies underlying the Copy-
right Act and trademark law."70 
If economic rationales are left aside as unfit for the position of fundamental 
public policies, differences in the equilibria of the freedom of speech and the 
right to property appear to present a crucial problem for recognition and 
enforcement. As Viewfinder shows, recognition and enforcement will be 
denied if the enforcing court insists that the equilibrium in the rendering 
country is the same as the one in the enforcing country. Such an approach 
presents a difficulty because it is quite likely that the equilibria will vary, 
even if just slightly; after all, they express countries' unique cultural and 
social fabrics which are not replicable in other countries. If the equilibria 
were the same, countries could harmonize their copyright laws completely 
and no public policy exception would burden recognition and enforcement 
of judgments based on the harmonized copyright laws. 
One may wonder whether any solution to the uneven equilibria problem 
exists, or whether countries should simply agree to disagree and not recog-
nize and enforce each other's judgments if they originate from different 
equilibria. It is submitted that the second approach is highly unfortunate for 
the future of copyright in the Internet environment. Insisting on a specific 
equilibrium between the two fundamental public policies in the copyright 
infringement context would ultimately mean that the worldwide norm 
would be the equilibrium of the country where freedom of speech was given 
the greatest weight; it would be this country to which potential infringers 
would move their assets and from which they would conduct their activities. 
Against any recognition and enforcement of judgments issued elsewhere they 
would be shielded because of the - to them favorable - provisions of the 
domestic copyright law. While such a situation may appeal to any country 
where freedom of speech is given more weight compared to other countries, 
such a country has to expect that judgments of its own courts will be denied 
recognition and enforcement in countries where the balance of the two 
fundamental public policies is different. Additionally, such a country may 
69 Ibid., point 24. 
70 Sari Louis Fearud Intern. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 406 ESupp.2d 274 (U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, 2005) 281. Internal quotation marks omitted. 
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one day be "out-liberalized" by another country, which may adopt yet more 
free-speech-favoring (or less private-property-favorable) copyright laws. 
There has been a concern that if a specific equilibrium of the two public 
policies is not required and foreign judgments are recognized and enforced 
despite the difference in the equilibria reached by the countries, the equilib-
rium most favorable to the right to property will become the worldwide norm. 
The assumption is that copyright owners will take advantage of liberal en-
forcement practices by choosing to litigate in the courts of a country with laws 
most favorable to copyright owners and having the judgments enforced 
against infringers in the country where their infringing activity originates, 
thereby affecting infringers' activity worldwide. The second concern - that 
copyright laws favoring property rights would prevail in the global competi-
tion of various jurisdictions - does not appear to be pertinent if enforcement of 
remedies is limited to a particular jurisdiction that such copyright laws cover. 
However, it has been considered difficult to limit the geographical scope of 
the impact of free-speech-restricting remedies on the Internet where domestic 
and worldwide publications are integrated and, therefore, any foreign inter-
vention regarding Internet publication affects, at the same time, the same 
domestic publication.71 An injunction against a foreign publication automa-
tically affects domestic publication, thereby imposing foreign copyright stan-
dards on domestic speech. However, while such concerns might have been 
warranted in the earlier "borderless" era of the Internet when it was feared 
that any injunction would be territorially limitless, today this fear appears to 
be largely unfounded because tools exist that can geographically limit access 
to Internet sites and permit courts to award, recognize and enforce remedies 
on the Internet while respecting the principle of territoriality. Domestic 
speech can thus remain intact even if access to it must be limited from a 
jurisdiction in which it was found to infringe a copyright because of local 
copyright laws that are balanced more in favor of the right to property. 
If the feasibility of geographical limitation of Internet-based remedies is 
recognized, the question remains whether courts can find an approach to the 
public policy scrutiny that prevents an avalanche of non-recognitions based 
on differences in the equilibria. Perhaps courts could view the equilibrium 
itself as a unitary public policy, whereby small differences in the equilibria of 
two countries would not be sufficient to trigger the public policy exception. 
As long as the equilibrium of the rendering country - i.e., the copyright law 
of the rendering country - reflected both components and a process of their 
rational weighing, the court of the enforcing country would not hold the 
foreign provisions on which the foreign judgment was based to be repugnant 
71 E.g., in the Yahoo! case: This "Court may not enforce a foreign order that violates the 
protections of the United States Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs si-
multaneously within our borders." Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Anti-
semitisme, 169 ESupp.2d 1181 (US District Court for the Northern District of California, 
2001) 1192. 
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to public policy. This suggested approach might be complemented by a link 
between the rational weighing of the two components and the international 
copyright treaties to which many countries adhered: the Berne Convention72 
and the TRIPS Agreement.73 Arguably, the rational weighing of the two 
components is embedded in the treaties. As long as countries comply with 
the provisions of the treaties, courts could perhaps expect that the countries' 
equilibria do not fall out of the acceptable range for recognition and enforce-
ment. 
2. The Public Policy Exception and Remedies 
Public policy concerns resulting in a rejection of recogmtIOn and enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment may also result from differences in the law on 
remedies and the practices of courts with respect to remedies. In copyright 
infringement cases, the remedies sought by copyright owners include injunc-
tions and monetary relief, and because they have a direct connection to the 
effects that the enforcement of the judgment will have in the enforcing 
country they are an indisputable object of public policy scrutiny. 
For a period of time, courts struggled with the territorial limitations of 
injunctions on the Internet; however, it appears that at the present stage of 
technological development the borderless age of the Internet may indeed be 
over. Viable mechanisms now exist that can limit the geographical scope of 
an Internet-based injunction with an effectiveness comparable to the ones 
achieved by injunctions concerning other media. 74 An injunction, if it may 
be considered for recognition and enforcement at all under the law of the 
enforcing country,75 may become a victim of the public policy exception if it 
exhibits extraterritorial ambitions. In general, courts should respect territori-
ality when issuing injunctions by limiting them to the territory of their own 
country,76 but even if they do not, the enforcing court can enforce them in 
the territorially limited manner. 
72 Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886; Paris Act, 1971. 
73 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1994. 
74 See, e.g., DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, "Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of 
Placing Borders on the "Borderless" Internet," 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 101. 
But cf. KIMBERLEE WEATHERALL, "Can Substantive Law Harmonisation and Technology 
Provide Genuine Alternatives to Conflict Rules in Intellectual Property," 11(4) Media & 
Arts Law Review 393 (2006). 
75 In Canada the Supreme Court in Pro Swing Inc. v. Etta Golf Inc., [20061 2 S.C.R. 612, 
2006 SCC 52, even when not recognizing the injunction in the particular case, neverthe-
less stated that the "traditional common law rule that limits the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign order to final money judgments should be changed." The UK as a Mem-
ber State of the EU must comply with the Brussels I Regulation, which requires that courts 
recognize and enforce their judgments (under given conditions) whether an award is mon-
etary or non-monetary. 
76 If courts consider copyright infringement to be a transitory cause of action and adjudicate 
copyright infringement for multiple countries, they may issue injunctions that will cover 
not only the domestic territory but also the territories of these other countries. 
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While monetary relief would seem to generate less controversy than injunc-
tions, punitive damages may, in practice, be difficult to enforce abroad. Civil 
law countries traditionally refuse to enforce punitive damages, which have a 
criminal law character (due to their functions as a punishment and deterrent) 
and are, therefore, an unacceptable remedy in civil proceedings.77 Yet, puni-
tive damages may be awarded as a result of a civil case in copyright infringe-
ment cases: In the u.s. punitive damages are awarded in infringement cases 
that involve common law copyright and in which recklessness or willfulness 
is proved. Although it may appear that not much has been left of common 
law copyright after the federal copyright statute, instances of common law 
copyright infringements do exist. For instance, in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Justin Combs Pub.,78 one of the copyrights at issue was a common law 
copyright to a sound recording that was released in 1972. The finding of 
copyright infringement in this case led to an award of compensatory and 
punitive damages. Under the federal copyright statute, punitive damages are 
not available; the statute gives a plaintiff the choice of either statutory 
damages or actual damages plus profits.79 A brief detour recently taken by 
the u.s. District Court for the Southern District of New York suggested that 
punitive damages might be awarded for infringement of statutory copyright, 
but u.s. courts now appear to agree that no punitive damages may be 
awarded for infringement of federal copyright.80 
However, a punitive component is present in the structure of remedies under 
'the u.s. federal statute. As in other countries, including some civil law 
77 On the attitude of civil law countries towards punitive damages and the related enforce-
ment problems see, for instance, SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, "Resolving Punitive-Damages 
Conflicts," Yearbook of Private International Law, Vol. 5, 3-4 (2003). 
78 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., 507 F.3d 470 (6th Circuit Court, 2007). 
79 17 U.S.c. § 504(a). 
80 The brief detour in the Southern District of New York began with an interpretation of a 
Second Circuit Court decision in Davies v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (2nd Circuit 
Court, 2001) in which the court mentioned that as a general rule, "punitive damages are 
not awarded in a statutory copyright action" (at 172), which led some to believe that an 
exception to the general rule might exist. Two 2003 district court decisions proposed that 
punitive damages were not foreclosed by the u.S. Copyright Act and suggested that actual 
damages had no "sufficient deterrent effect" (Andrea Blanch v. Jeff Koons, 329 F.Supp.2d 
568, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2003, 569), and, there-
fore, punitive damages should be available in addition to actual damages plus profits. 
However, neither of the two cases actually led to a decision on punitive damages. In the 
first case the judge concluded that the case at issue did not present the kind of 
circumstances under which punitive damages could be contemplated, and in the second 
case no final decision on punitive damages was issued because at the end the plaintiffs 
elected statutory damages as an alternative. Following other district court level decisions 
that rejected the holding in Blanch, District Court Judge Stanton revised his earlier posi-
tion on the availability of punitive damages in his 2008 opinion in Viacom Intern. Inc. 
v. Youtube, Inc., 2008 WL 629951 (US District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, 2008), in which he stated that it "is time to extinguish the ignis fatuus held out by 
Blanch. Common-law punitive damages cannot be recovered under the Copyright Act." 
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countries, the statute provides for enhanced statutory damages81 that actu-
ally have a punitive element. The U.S. Sixth Circuit Court in Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub. calculated that "the ratio of the punitive 
portion of statutory damages under the Act is 4:1."82 In the English case 
Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Health Service Trust v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd,83 Justice Pumfrey explained that the drafting history of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act clearly shows that additional damages 
under Sec. 97 of the Act were intended to maintain the deterrent effect 
characteristic of exemplary damages. He noted that "there are certain cate-
gories of cases in which an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful 
purpose in vindicating the strength of the law and thus affording a practical 
justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought logically 
to belong to the criminal."84 Of the civil law countries, for instance, Slovenia 
allows treble damages to be awarded if either intent or gross negligence in 
infringement is proven.85 
Due to their punitive elements, even enhanced statutory damages cause 
discomfort in countries that do not accept punishment and deterrence as a 
characteristic of civil remedies. Such discomfort was apparent when the 
Proposal for the EU Enforcement Directive was discussed in the EU Council 
working group, where some countries involved in the negotiations resisted a 
proposed provision mandating the introduction of double royalties as an 
alternative to compensatory damages and recovery of lost profits. 86 The 
assurance in the original proposal that the provision did not "constitute 
punitive damages"87 did not suffice, and the provision that was finally 
adopted reflected the compromise achieved during the negotiations: 
Art. 13(1) generally provides that damages may be set "as a lump sum on the 
basis of elements such as at least the amount of royalties or fees which would 
have been due if the infringer had requested authorisation to use the intellec-
tual property right in question." Therefore, on the one hand there is room 
for EU Member States that wish to maintain or introduce double or treble 
royalties, while on the other hand no obligation is imposed on other Member 
States to enforce any enhanced statutory damages. 
However, since enhanced statutory damages are no longer foreign to civil 
law countries, it is questionable whether countries' opposition to punitive 
damages per se should still warrant refusals to enforce the punitive damages 
81 17 U.S.c. § 504(c)(2). 
82 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Pub., supra note 78, at 491. 
83 Nottinghamshire Healthcare National Health Service Trust v. News Group Newspapers 
Ltd, [2002] R.P.C. 49. 
84 Ibid., 979. 
85 Copyright Act, Art. 168. 
86 "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Measures and 
Procedures to Ensure the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights," 30 January 2003, 
COM(2003) 46 final, Art. 17.1. 
87 Ibid., 23. 
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awarded abroad. If civil law countries actually adopted a deterring and 
punishing mechanism of civil redress in these cases, there should be no public 
policy argument to reject foreign civil remedies with deterring and punishing 
components. Naturally, a critical review by u.s. courts of punitive damages 
that are considered excessive may also exert a positive effect on the civil law 
countries' perception of punitive damages from this particular jurisdiction.88 
There have already been instances in which civil law courts have enforced 
punitive damages, and Professor Gotanda suggests that these instances in-
dicate a general trend: "Recent developments in France, Germany, and the 
European Union, as well as in Canada, Australia, and Spain point toward 
greater receptivity toward punitive damages and the enforcement of these 
foreign awards."89 He points to proposals for reforming the Code of Obliga-
tions in France, in which a provision for punitive damages was contem-
plated,90 and decisions by German courts in which a sufficiently deterrent 
effect of damages was considered.91 An example of a positive approach to 
punitive damages in a civil law country that is most relevant to this analysis 
is a 2001 decision of the Spanish Supreme Court in Miller Import Corp. 
v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L.,92 a case that concerned the "unauthorized use of 
intellectual property, violation of a registered trademark, and unfair compe-
tition. "93 The defendant in the case was not successful with the public policy 
argument against the enforcement of punitive damages awarded by a u.S. 
court; the Spanish Supreme Court determined that "punitive damages cannot 
be considered as a concept that is (completely) counter to public policy."94 
Whether these developments start a trend or not, it appears that enhanced 
statutory or punitive damages awarded in copyright infringement cases have 
the potential to penetrate civil law countries' opposition to the enforcement 
of punitive damages. 
Conclusion 
When deciding whether to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment con-
cerning copyright infringement, courts may entertain the public policy ex-
ception as one of the grounds for non-recognition of the judgment. In the 
88 See the Spanish Supreme Court decision in Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, 
S.L., translation by SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, 24 J.L. & Com. 225, 242. On the impact of the 
u.S. tort reform, see SYMEONIDES, supra note 77, at 9-14. 
89 Id. 
90 Ibid., 517. 
91 Ibid., 519. Similarly, Professor VOLKER BEHR suggests that "[dlespite apparent differences 
between German and American black letter doctrine, recent developments suggest that the 
gap is narrowing for practical purposes." VOLKER BEHR, "Punitive Damages in American 
and German Law - Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Con-
cepts," 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 105, 148. 
92 2039/1999. 
93 Miller Import Corp. v. Alabastres Alfredo, S.L., supra note 88, at 231. 
94 Ibid., 242. 
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future, even if a proposal is adopted for an international instrument on 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in intellectual property matters, 
the possibility will be maintained for courts to scrutinize foreign judgments 
against the public policy of the enforcing country. Therefore, notwithstand-
ing how much easier recognition and enforcement may become thanks to 
such an instrument, the public policy exception may remain the potential 
last hurdle to effective cross-border enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. 
The exception requires a court to assess the effects that a foreign judgment 
would have in the enforcing country; therefore, remedies are the obvious 
target of the scrutiny. Yet it appears that remedies and countries' variant 
understanding of remedies are becoming less of a problem for cross-border 
enforcement. u.s. courts appear to be willing to correct excessive punitive 
damages and civil law countries seem to be revisiting their approach to 
punitive elements in copyright remedies. The Supreme Court in Canada has 
suggested that common law countries consider enforcing foreign non-mone-
tary relief,95 and new technological tools now permit enforcement of territo-
rially limited injunctions on the Internet where the imposition of interna-
tional borders has been resisted. 
However, differences in substantive copyright laws remain a concern as 
courts scrutinize not only remedies but also examine the underlying foreign 
law. Because copyright laws are not completely harmonized among coun-
tries, differences among the laws may trigger application of the public policy 
exception if they reflect a fundamental public policy inconsistency. The fact 
that countries are not able to agree on a complete copyright harmonization 
suggests that many of the prevailing differences arise from significant incon-
sistencies and have the potential to become grounds for application of the 
exception. 
The nature of the exception does not permit its unification in an interna-
tional treaty; its precise shape cannot be captured even in a domestic statute. 
Therefore, it cannot be approached as other obstacles to recognition and 
enforcement and be unified by single universal provisions such as jurisdic-
tional or choice-of-Iaw rules. Only courts may shape the exception in their 
decisions by adopting either a more or less comity-furthering approach; 
some courts have already expressed their belief that the new globalized 
environment requires especially comity-furthering treatment of the excep-
tion. In the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, "[g]reater comity is 
required in our modern era when international transactions involve a con-
stant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe. "96 
95 Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., supra note 75. 
96 Hunt v. T&N pic, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Supreme Court of Canada). See also Bad Ass 
Coffee Company of Hawaii Inc. v. Bad Ass Enterprises Inc., 2007 ABQB 581 (Court of 
Queen's Bench of Alberta): "The defence of public policy must be narrowly defined to 
allow the increasingly global marketplace to operate." 
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However, facilitation of international trade might not be the most conclusive 
argument for a comity-furthering approach to the exception; rather, consid-
eration must also be given to options left to the rendering country when it 
obtains no assistance with the enforcement of its injunctions on the Internet. 
The architecture of the Internet requires cooperation among countries in 
copyright enforcement. A single country cannot by itself effectively enforce 
its own copyright laws on the Internet. For instance, a French court in a civil 
case cannot be expected (in a democratic society) to order that the French 
government block certain web pages because the material posted breaches 
copyright in France. Only the infringer can be ordered to take appropriate 
action and stop infringing the copyright by blocking access to the copy-
righted material by users located in France. If the infringer is acting outside 
the jurisdiction of the French court and his assets are also located elsewhere, 
the French court will not be able to enforce an injunction aimed at regulating 
the infringer's conduct unless it receives assistance from a court in the 
country where the infringer acts or where his assets are located. Without 
cooperation by the foreign court, French copyright law will be eviscerated. 
Each country has a vested interest in the enforcement of copyright laws, 
including cross-border cases, because no right really exists (and no right or 
underlying policy is really furthered) without effective enforcement. Whether 
a country's copyright policy is based on the premise that copyright is an 
indispensable incentive for authors to generate copyrightable works or a 
natural right vested in an author, the policy will not be implemented if 
authors cannot rely on their rights being protected. The Internet as a signifi-
cant - and perhaps soon the prevailing - mode of dissemination should not 
provide an easy escape from liability for infringers; such a black hole in the 
enforcement universe would soon result in copyright owners not only losing 
their natural right but, arguably, also an incentive to create. 
Christian Handig':-
The Copyright Term "Work" -
European Harmonisation at an Unknown Level 
Is the pop song played on the radio a copyright work? Does this hold true 
for a logo or a photograph on a website? Under copyright law, the answer to 
this question is essential, as a "work" is a prerequisite to applying the rules 
of copyright. Nevertheless, under many European copyright laws there is no 
easy answer where exactly to draw the line between copyright works and 
productions that are not copyright works. This might come as a surprise in 
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